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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH UTILITY SHAREHOLDERS ASSOCIA-
TION, ALEX OBLAD and HAROLD BURTON; 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
SERVICES; UTAH COALITION OF SENIOR 
CITIZENS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE .COMMISSION OF UTAH; 
MILLY O. BERNARD, Chairman, DAVID 
IRVINE, Commissioner, and BRENT 
CAMERON, Commissioner, 
Respondents, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation; WEXPRO COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION 
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES; and UTAH COM-
MITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES, 
Defendants/Intervenor-
Responden ts. 
Case Nos. 18286, 18303, 18304 
ANSWERING BRIEF OF 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
AND 
WEXPRO COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Case arises out of proceedings before the Public Service 
Commission of Utah, in part on remand from an Opinion of this Court 
1/ 
of May 10, 1979,- in which a Stipulation and Agreement of the 
Y In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 595 P.2d 
871 (Utah 1979), generically referred to as the "Wexpro Case", this Court 
reversed and remanded the matter to the Utah Commission for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with the holding of the Opinion. In the course of 
those proceedings, the Commission .addressed the larger issues of the 
Mountain Fuel exploration and development program, and after a hearing on 
a Motion for approval of a settlement Agreement, a remedy was fashioned 
and Order entered by the Commission that ran to the entire MFS exploration 
and development operations. 
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adversary parties in the earlier case with regard to the manner, 
·method and accounting of the operation and development of Mountain 
Fuel's oil, gas and wildcat properties were comprehensively reviewed 
and then approved by the Commission in its Order of December 31, 
1981. For the convenience of the Court, there is filed as a separ-
ate Attachment to this Brief true copies of the Stipulation and 
the Agreement together with a copy of the December 31, 1981 Order 
of the Commission approving the settlement. 
PARTIES BEFORE THE UTAH COMMISSION 
The public parties before the Commission (Utah PSC or Commission) 
in the proceedings below were the Utah Division of Public Utilities 
(Division) and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) 
2/ 
represented by the Attorney General and his Assistants.- Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company (MFS) and Wexpro Company (Wexpro) were investor 
owned private companies whose properties and interests were directly 
affected. The Utility Shareholders Association (Shareholders) 
appeared as an intervenor as did the Utah Coalition of Senior 
Citizens (Coalition) and each fully participated in the Commission 
proceedings below. The Utah Department of Administrative Services 
(Administrative Services) , while not participating in the principal 
proceedings before the Commission, filed a petition for rehearing 
to the Commission Order of December 31, 1981. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY THE COMMISSION 
The Commission initially set the case down for hearing on 
remand, as to whether a transfer to Wexpro of the historically 
y The Division of Public Utilities and Committee of Consumer Services were 
the appellants in the initial appeal before thi.s. rn_1Jrt- c 
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classified non-utility oil properties by MFS was in the public 
interest and otherwise consistent with the holding of this court. 
The scope of the hearing was later expanded to include numerous 
additional issues relating to the entire exploration program. 
After several continuances granted because of pending negotiations, 
the Division, Committee, Mountain Fuel and Wexpro submitted a pro-
posed Stipulation and Agreement of settlement of all issues to the 
Commission for its review and approval. Because the Stipulation 
and Agreement were between the parties to the initial controversy 
and included the public agencies acting in behalf of the ratepayers, 
the Commission ordered a hearing and review of all aspects of the 
Stipulation and Agreement as to whether they were, in fact, consis-
tent with re~ulatory policy and in the public interest and whether 
such were in conformance with the holding of this Court. After 
eight days of testimony, substantial argument and written briefs, 
the matter was submitted to the Commission after which it issued 
its Order and Report, including Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, on December 31, 1981. 
From that Order, the Shareholders, the Coalition, and the 
Administrative Services filed separate petitions for rehearing 
which were denied by the Commission on February 9, 1982. Indivi-
dual petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed with this Court 
by each of said interests seeking review of the December 31, 1981 
Order. The certiorari appeals were consolidated for briefing, 
argument and disposition. 
ISSUES ON CERTIORARI APPEALS 
The questions presented for review by this Court by the appeals 
of the Shareholders, Administrative Services, and the Coalition are: 
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1. Did the Commission have jurisdiction to accept 
the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties and 
determine that such Stipulation and Agreement 
should be accepted? 
2. Are the Findings and Conclusions that the Stipulation 
and Agreement settling the Wexpro case were in the 
public interest supported by competent evidence? 
3. Did the Commission err in law in accepting and adopt-
ing the Stipulation and Agreement which settled the 
Wexpro litigation? 
4. Does the Commission Report and Order sufficiently 
define and approve the settlement, including the 
transfers of property to Wexpro and Celsius, as 
to be afforded the finality of res judicata? 
5. Did the Commission err in not ordering an apprai-
sal to determine the value in dollars of all the 
properties involved in the settlement? 
SUMMARY OF MFS AND WEXPRO POSITION 
The Report and Order of the Commission in this Case should be 
affirmed. This Court, in Committee of Consumer Services, supra 
remanded the case to the Commission with directions to conduct 
further proceedings (595 P.2d at 871). The Commission did just 
that. 
Extensive hearings were held and the Stipulation and the 
Agreement of the parties were submitted only after intense, leng-
thy and extremely difficult negotiations. The overwhelming and 
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competent evidence supports the Findings of the Commission that 
the Stipulation and Agreement were in the public interest, in 
the interest of the ratepayer and implement the regulatory policy 
of this State. Such Findings, being supported by competent, un-
controverted evidence, are thus, by statute, not open to cha!-
lenge or review before this Court. The Commission Order obser-
ved and the Stipulation and Agreement incorporated the principles 
set forth by this Court in the initial Nexpro decision. 
The method of valuation of the properties transferred was 
also correctly determined, was consistent with industry stand-
ards, resulted in a transfer for fair market consideration and 
was in the public interest. 
The Report and Order of the Commission deal with the transfer 
3/ 
of properties to Wexpro and Celsius- and with the allocation of 
benefits from the producing properties with finality with the 
doctrine of res judicata applicable to property transfers and 
other provisions of the Report and Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The presentations of the facts in the record made in the open-
ing Briefs of Appellants are incomplete. Administrative Services 
essentially ignores the record in this proceeding and, instead, 
devotes 65 pages in an emotional and erroneous translation of the 
original record in the first Wexpro case, as though that matter 
Celsius Energy Company (Celsius) a wholly controlled affiliate of MFS 
was established for the purpose of holding the exploration acreage and 
of conducting the oil and gas exploration activities, all as contem-
plated by the Stipulation and Agreement of settlement. (Tr. 961, 
1409-10; Stipulation§ 17.4) 
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was again before the Court. The record and issues in the 
original Wexpro case are completely different from the record 
4/ 
and issues in the instant appeal.- This Case and its record 
relate to the approval of the Stipulation and Agreement of 
settlement and in no sense constitute a rehearing of Wexpro. 
Accordingly, the Statement of Administrative Services is of 
very little assistance. 
On the other hand, the factual statement of the Shareholders 
is accurate but incomplete to an analysis of all of the issues on 
appeal. Therefore, MFS and Wexpro set forth their statement of 
Facts in accordance with Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P. 
1. Mountain Fuel Exploration and Development Program. John 
Crawford, Jr., Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer 
of MFS, testified that the Company was organized in 1935 through 
the consolidation of several companies, including an oil company, 
and maintained from its inception an exploration and development 
program including ownership of and rights to certain oil properties. 
The oil operations of Mountain Fuel were, from the beginning of 
!/ In Wexpro the PSC ordered that it did not have jurisdiction over or to 
approve or disapprove the transfer of certain oil properties historically 
(pursuant to prior Commission orders) classified in a non-utility oil 
account of MFS. It also approved an Amended Agreement of Purchase and 
Sale and an Amended Joint Exploration Agreement (J.E.A.) between MFS and 
Wexpro. This Court reversed the PSC Order and indicated that with regard 
to Commission jurisdiction, the elements of classification of the oil 
properties as non-utility should be re-examined (albeit retroactively). 
The settlement bears no relationship to the Amended Agreement of Purchase 
and Sale and the program provided for therein bears no similarity to the 
J.E.A. The appeal now before the Court does not involve any such juris-
dictional or classification issue, because the Stipulation and Agreement 
of settlement assum~ that the PSC has jurisdiction over all oil and gas 
properties, whether previously classified as non-utility or utility. 
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the Commission regulation in 1940, excluded from utility regula-
5/ 
tion.- Beginning in 1947, the Commission utilized, a method of 
accounting for the classification of gas properties as utility 
assets and oil properties as non-utility assets and over the 
years, approved, if not mandated, such classification system 
for MFS. (Tr. 1374-86) Repeated attempts were made over the 
years of regulation to have the Commission order MFS to include 
oil revenues in its utility accounts to reduce gas rates, but 
such attempts were specifically denied. (Tr. 1378-1383) For 
example, the exact method used in classifying oil wells and gas 
wells, which this Court disapproved in 1979, was expressly adopted 
6/ 
by the Commission in a 1959 Order. (Tr. 1380)-
As the exploration and development program of MFS was carried 
out over the years, both the utility and non-utility accounts made 
contributions to its functions. (Tr. 1376-1379) Even though all 
of the capital costs of leasehold acquisition of oil and gas 
exploration acreage, all of the capital costs of oil exploration 
and drilling, and a proportionate share of unsuccessful dry hole 
expenses were paid from the MFS non-utility accounts (Tr. 1376-81), 
the inclusion of a portion of unsuccessful drilling costs as an 
expen$e in setting gas rates and the existence of the non-utility 
oil properties continued to cause contention. (Tr. 1377) In 
1974, the Commission proposed to use oil revenues to reduce gas 
~ In 1940, the Commission issued an order eliminating oil wells from utility 
rate base accounts as not being used and useful in the sale of natural gas. 
(Tr. 1374) 
§./ PSC Case No. 4797. 
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rates (Tr. 1382), but backed-off in the face of the suspension 
of trading and a disastrous market decline in the value of MFS' 
stock on the New York Stock Exchange. (Tr. 1382-3) 
In the Spring of 1976, MFS faced a proxy battle to remove 
present management because of the continuing problem with the 
separated, unregulated oil properties. (Tr. 1388-9) In late 
1976 MFS created Wexpro, a wholly-owned subsidiary, and trans-
ferred to it the oil properties, then held in a long established 
non-utility account. Wexpro was also to have conducted a joint 
drilling program with Mountain Fuel under the J.E.A. The Com-
mission, after requiring some amendments and concluding that 
it did not possess jurisdiction over the transfer of the non-
utility oil properties from MFS to Wexpro, approved on April 11, 
1978 the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the J.E.A. between MFS 
and Wexpro. The Division and the Committee, by certiorari, 
appealed that Order to this Court. 
2. Holding of Supreme Court on Appeal. This Court, under 
Opinion dated May 10, 1979, reversed the Report and Order of the 
Commission and decided that until there was an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine whether the transferred oil properties were, in 
fact, non-utility assets, there was not an adequate basis to 
determine whether the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction 
reached the transfer. The Court also reversed the Order of the 
7/ 
PSC approving the Amended Agreement of Purchase and Sale.-
The majority Opinion authored by Maughan, C. J., went on 
to observe that the traditional concepts of public utility law, 
2/ See 595 P.2d at 873, 877 .. 
_o_ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
viz., that the investor supplies risk capital and sustains the 
loss of a speculative· venture, may have been modified over the 
years in the MFS exploration program through an exploration 
expense for unsuccessful well drilling being reflected in utility 
rates. The Maughan Opinion stated that such charges were, in 
effect, a capital contribution bi customers to a speculative 
venture. 
The majority Opinion also observed that exploration or 
development properties should be transferred by Mountain Fuel 
only for fair mark~t consideration so that an "appropriate" benefit 
could be realized by customers and then only after the Comission 
has determined whether the transaction is detrimental to the 
8/ 
ratepayer and in the public interest.-
The majority Opinion also commented on the question of 
whether the arrangement between Wexpro and Mountain Fuel, re-
garding the sale of natural gas at market price on developed 
acreage other than that transferred under the Agreement, viola-
ted the "no-profits-to-affiliates" rule. The Opinion suggested 
that such a sale would so do. 
The decision also declared that Wexpro had the option of 
v 
withdrawing from the Joint Exploration Agreement. 
3. Case on Remand Before Commission. Soon after the issu-
ance of the majority Opinion, Wexpro availed itself of the option 
and terminated the Joint Exploration Agreement (Tr. 1479, Stipula-
tion §§ 1.14, 1.16), thus making moot the question of whether the 
~ See 595 P.2d at 878. 
2/ See 595 P.2d at 879. 
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1976 transfer and proposed exploration program were detrimental 
to the MFS customer, in the public interest, or for market value. 
The Case, upon remand to the Commission, was set down to 
determine whether any exploration and development properties of 
Mountain Fuel and particularly the classified non-utility oil 
properties, should be transferred to Wexpro as consonant with 
the public interest, whether such would be detrimental to the 
customers of MFS, and if a transfer were proposed, what conditions 
should be attached to benefit the customers and to satisfy the 
public interest. 
The parties before the Commission on remand were those 
before the Supreme Court in the original Wexpro appeal, namely, 
the Division, the Committee, MFS, Wexpro and the individual 
shareholders Oblad and Burton. In addition, the CoalLtion and 
the Shareholders Association sought and were granted permission 
to intervene. The preliminary motions and pre-trial proceedings 
before the Commission were vigorously contested between the 
parties, with MFS and Wexpro raising a number of Federal and 
State constitutional questions. In addition, litigation had 
been initiated by MFS and Wexpro against the Division, the Com-
mittee, and the Commission before the United States Court for 
Utah raising constitutional questions sterning from the May 10, 
10/ 
1979 Opinion of this Court,~ and reorganization proceedings 
10/ Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service Conunission of Utah, et al., 
U.S. District Court No. C-80-0710J. While said complaint was dismissed 
as premature in July of 1981, the dismissal was without prejudice to 
refile upon completion of the pending proceedings before the Conunission. 
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had been initiated by MFS before the Federal Energy Regulatory 
11/ 
Commission in Washington, D.C.~ 
4. Stipulation and Settlement of Case. During the pendency 
of the Case before the Commission on remand, numerous problems 
and practical considerations required MFS to make certain busi-
ness decisions and to advise the Conunission that the sweep of 
the majority Opinion of the Supreme Court in Wexpro had made 
it virtually impossible for the Company to conduct a utility 
exploration and development program or. to raise new investment 
capital for that purpose. MFS was experiencing great difficulty 
raising investment capital and retaining its exploration person-
nel. Shareholders of MFS were unwilling to invest further 
monies until it was determined the manner in which risk capi-
tal for exploration and development would be treated and account-
ed for by MFS and Wexpro. (Tr. 1137-43, 1475-79) 
The expert witnesses testified that: the drillng program 
in the future was going to require investment of about $200 mil-
lion (Tr. 1056); the required funds could not be generated inter-
nally (Tr. 1529); the shareholders would not support a joint pro-
gram with customers and it would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to raise outside capital; the exploration program was 
at a standstill (Tr. 1039-40).; leases were expiring (Tr. 1479); the 
Company was experiencing great difficulty retaining skilled explor-
11/ FERC Docket Nos. CPB0-274, CPB0-275 and CI80-233. 
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ation personnel; the proceedings and litigation were diverting 
inordinate amounts of time of corporate management of MFS (Tr. 
1480); the Company had every reason, under the circumstances, 
to "hold back" on the exploration program (Tr. 1040). 
The exploration program was, thus, on "hold" by 1980 because 
of the unresolved litigation (Tr. 1039-1040); there was concern 
on the part of all parties that leases on wildcat acreage were 
expiring, commitments to drill should be made as part of an 
on-going exploration program and that unless the Commission 
proceedings (which had been pending since late 1976) were re-
solved quickly and the pending litigation finally terminated, 
the exploration and development program of MFS would be irre-
parably damaged, regardless of who prevailed, to the injury of 
ratepayers, stockholders, and the Company. 
152 0-21, 152 9} 
(Tr. 943, 944-45, 
For the better part of six months in the Spring and Summer 
1981, intensive negotiations were conducted between legal counsel 
for the Division and Committee on the one hand, and Mountain Fuel 
and Wexpro, on the other hand. Expert economic and petroleum 
industry consultants also attended and participated. The nego-
tiations were "very tough, and hard nosed", conducted at "arms-
length", with impasse being reached at several points. (Tr. 8 99-
900, 1015) As one legal counsel put it to the Commission, the 
negotiations were the most complex, involved, and difficult in 
a long career of legal practice. (Tr. 891-92) Counsel for the 
Coalition was invited to attend any negotiating sessions and 
although such invitation was declined, the Coalition was apprised 
of general developments taking place. (Tr. 952-53) During the 
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negotiations, one of the principal concerns was that any stipula-
tion or settlement reached be generally consistent with the ob-
servations and holdings of this Court in the Wexpro Opinion. 
In late August 1981, a settlement, subject to final draft-
ing, was reached among the Division, Committee, Mountain Fuel, 
and Wexpro with regard to the allocation of benefits from the 
producing reservoirs, the conduct and operation of exploration 
and development, the transfer of properties, the credits to 
utility accounts for the benefit of customers, the preservation 
of cost-of-service gas, the recognition of capital investment, 
and other relevant factors. The settlement took the form of a 
Stipulation between counsel for the principal parties and an 
Agreement between the parties which were laid before the Com-
mission under a Joint Petition for approval. 
The Commission thereupon held hearings in October and Novem-
ber 1981 on the questions of whether the Stipulation and Agree-
ment were detrimenta~ to ratepayers, whether they were in the pub-
lic interest, and whether such should be approved or rejected as 
consistent with the regulatory policy of the Commission and the 
prior Opinion of this Court. 
5. Terms of Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. The 
Stipulation and Agreement are comprehensive regarding the explor-
ation and development of Mountain Fuel properties held in both the 
utility and nori-utility accounts. They are complex, lenghy and 
detailed. 
A summary of the Stipulation and Agreement has been set out 
both in the Answering Brief of the Division and the Committee (pages 
12-18) and the opening Brief of the Shareholders (pages 9-15) here-
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in. Apart from editorial comments in the Division and Committee 
Brief, the factual summaries in both Briefs are accurate, 
are adopted by MFS and Wexpro for purposes of this Brief, 
and the Court is referred to such summaries. 
6. Commission Proceedings on Stipulation and Agreement of 
Settlement. For eight days, the Commission took testimony 
from expert economists, accountants, petroleum engineers, energy 
and utility rate consultants, petroleum geologists, security 
analysts, shareholders, officers of MFS and Wexpro, an Assis-
tant Attorney General, and public witnesses regarding the factual 
and legal policy surrounding the Stipulation and Agreement. The 
following is a capsule summary of the evidence: 
Herman G. Roseman. Engaged by the Division, Roseman is an 
economist and regulatory consultant of national standing with 
substantial experience as an employee of the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC) in the regulation of utility and oil and gas 
companies. (Tr. 1009-13) Roseman was retained by the Division 
as an expert witness to testify ~n what was expected to be a 
sharply contested trial, but when settlement talks developed, 
he assisted the Division in negotiations. 
As to a fully litigated contest between MFS on one side and 
the Division and Committee on the other, Roseman was not sure 
which would be worse for the consumer -- a win by MFS or a win 
by the customers. Both "appeared to be disastrous outcomes". 
' (Tr. 1017) A customer win causing a complete roll-in of the 
previously designated non-utility oil properties into the utility 
gas accounts for rate making would severely curtail and perhaps 
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even eliminate the MFS exploration program. (Tr. 1017) Roseman 
further testified that if a roll-in were to occur, all MFS would 
receive from future exploration would be the possibility of earn-
ing a utility rate of return for cost-of-service gas, as reduced 
by oil revenues. Such would not attract new capital and investors 
who needed the prospects of unregulated returns to invest in high 
risk oil and gas exploration. (Tr. 1031-33) Roseman further 
believed that a roll-in would have a major a·na adverse financial 
impact on MFS, making it extremely difficult for the Company to 
raise either common equity or debt capital on reasonable terms. 
(Tr. 1040-4) 
Roseman was also of the judgment that a complete roll-in of 
the oil properties and revenues would have a very negative impact 
upon MFS personnel and would probably result in a much less aggres-
sive program. In response to a Commission inquiry, Roseman stated 
that a higher regulated rate of return on the rolled-in properties 
would not solve the fundamental economic realities. (Tr. 1042) 
Roseman strongly supported the settlement Agreement before 
the Commission, testifying that it provided incentives for the 
development of oil and gas acreage while protecting the interests 
of the customers of MFS in cost-of-service gas and future reserves. 
(Tr. 1023, 1029-30) Beyond that, Roseman testified that while the 
customers had a claim on a substantial fraction of the oil profits, 
he was "never persuaded that the share was 100%." The 54% share 
arrived at in the settlement Agreement was slightly better than 
he had hoped to achieve as a minimum in the litigation, particu-
larly in light of other aspects of the Agreement. (Tr. 1024) 
-15-
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Roseman was of the view that oil and gas exploration and 
development has not proved successful as a regulated public 
utility function. (Tr. 1022) Apart from the many other problems, 
it was difficult for a regulatory commission to cover the Company 
in the "down side risk" of successive dry holes. (Tr. 1033, 1042) 
The formation of joint ventures to share the risk of deep and dif-
ficult drilling is common in the Rocky Mountain area, but Roseman 
testified that exploration companies do, in fact, shy away from 
being a "joint venturer with a regulated utility", because the 
venture may subject the operator to regulation. (Tr. 1032, 1034) 
Roseman testified that under the settlement, the utility 
receives the benefit of customers substantial overriding royalty 
interest of 7% on undeveloped wildcat acreage which he characterized 
as "a fairly high figure as overriding royalties in the oil business 
go". (Tr. 1026) Also all contributions from customers are elimin-
ated, both with regard to carrying charges on undeveloped acreage 
or dry hole costs. In short, the customer bears no risk in wildcat 
drilling or otherwise under the Agreement. (Tr. 1024, 1028) 
As to the no-profit-to-affiliate rule, Roseman stated that in 
his experience with the Federal Power Commission in the regulation 
of natural gas public utilities, the theory has not been applied 
so as to eliminate all profit between affiliated companies, but 
only excessive profits that may come through either self dealing 
or a monopoly position brought about by regulation. (Tr. 1038) 
Reasonable profit between affiliated companies should be allowed. 
(Tr. 1038) Even in the case of cost-of-service gas from the pro-
duction of MFS, itself, the Commission has always recognized the 
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element of profit for return on capital. (Tr. 1039) Roseman knew 
of no instance in which cost-of-service gas prices do not include 
a reasonable return on capital. 
Roseman emphasized that the entire settlement and all of its 
various constituent parts were: "interrelated." (Tr. 1015, 1045) 
The settlement must be viewed in its entirety (Tr. 1021) in order 
to properly assess the consideration which flowed to the benefit 
of customers. ·(Tr. 1023-25) The individual aspects of the nego-
tiations and settlement should not be isolated when examining the 
totality of the bargain. The consideration and benefits received 
by the customers for the settlement are for fair market value and 
in the public interest. (Tr. 1029-30) 
Roseman pointed out that if the settlement had not been 
reached, there was a great risk that customers would lose the 
benefit of cost-of-service gas as a result of federal regulation. 
He characterized this possibility as "the greatest single risk" 
of litigating the case in an adversarial atmosphere. (Tr. 1018) 
The settlement removes this risk from the customer and assures 
continued availability of cost-of-service gas. 
Richard Walker. Mr. Walker, a CPA with 35 years experience 
and senior partner of Arthur Andersen & Co. in Chicago, specializes 
in utility regulation. He has performed work for a substantial 
number of natural gas and oil companies, including natural gas 
transportation and distribution utilities. Walker was retained 
by MFS to review the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement. 
Mr. Walker testified that one of the oldest problems in 
utility regulation is keeping the role of the investor and the 
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customer clear. (Tr. 1193) The investor supplies the risk 
capital and needs to know what that risk will be and what he 
can expect as a reward. The operating expenses of a utility 
company are recovered in the price of the services and products 
sold to the customer. Investment capital is provided by share-
holders and bondholders. The customer should not become an 
involuntary supplier of capital. (Tr. 1194) Walker testified 
that, by and large, unsuccessful exploration and development 
expenses, including nonproductive dry hole operations, are viewed 
in this country as an item of current operating expense in fixing 
utility gas rates. However, the Supreme Court of Utah, in the 
Wexpro decision, seemed to say that such _current operating 
expenses were, in reality, capital contributions. With that 
finding, the roles of the investor and the customer were reversed 
and confused. (Tr. 1207) Whether the conunent of the Utah Court 
to this effect was either central or gratuitous to its opinion 
in Wexpro, Mr. Walker stated that under the Agreement of settle-
ment, the roles of the investor and the customer are clearly 
separated with exploration and development costs, including the 
risk of dry holes, placed with the investor. This is "very 
desirable". {Tr. 1195) 
Turning to the no-profit-to-affiliate rule, Walker stated 
that American utility law, as he understands it, permits a fair 
profit in affiliated transactions. {Tr. 1199-1200) Mr. Walker 
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had reviewed the actual records in two cases cited by the Utah 
Court in its Wexpro decision on the no-profit-to-affiliate rule. 
He testified that in both cases, the affiliate was permitted, by 
the final court decision, to earn a reasonable return on capital 
invested. (Tr. 1199-1200) 
As to the provisions in the settlement Agreement relating to 
sales of natural gas between MFS-Wexpro and MFS-Celsius, the no-
profit-to-affiliate principal has no application in any event, 
because the bargaining parties were not MFS and Wexpro or Celsius, 
but wer~ MFS and Wexpro on one side of the table and the Division 
and the Committee on the other side. (Tr. 1201) 
Walker testified that oil and gas exploration is not well 
suited to utility regulation because of the high risks and great 
uncertainty in the value of discoveries in relation to expenditures. 
(Tr. 1202-3) Walker was opposed to conscripting or labeling as 
investment capital the payments made by customers in purchasing 
natural gas. (Tr. 1204) Of the many pipeline and distribution 
utilities having exploration programs which Mr. Walker represents, 
none of them have exploration and development on-going in a regula~ 
ted entity other than those properties which are just living out 
their lives. (Tr. 1205) Further, exploration companies in the 
field are not anxious to conduct joint explorations or operations 
with regulated utilities. (Tr. 1205) 
Mr. Walker stated that a joint program between investor and 
utility customer would not work since the investor would be an 
unwilling partner and could receive a substantially different return 
than the customer, the latter of whom may take his return off the 
top in a regulated operation. (Tr. 1213-4) 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
John F. O'Leary. Mr. O'Leary, called by the Shareholders, 
was formerly Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, 
Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration, Chief Energy 
Officer of the State of New Mexico, Director of Licensing of the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the U.S. Bureau of 
Minerals, Chief of the Bureau of Natural Gas of the Federal Power 
Commission, and Deputy Asst. Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Interior responsible for energy matters. (Tr. 1216) 
O'Leary testified that in his experience, natural gas explora-
tion in the various states is generally carried out as a non-utility · 
function with the gas being transferred to the utility at market 
price. (Tr. 1218) Federal regulation, as well, of exploration by 
regulated pipeline companies was changed to a non-utility activity 
in 1969. (Tr. 1218-23) O'Leary stated that an involuntary dril-
ling program forced on the Company would not be successful and 
would cause good personnel to leave MFS employment. (Tr. 1226-8) 
A joint program between the customer and the shareholder will not 
work. (Tr. 1230) 
Contrary to the assumption that Administrative Services and 
the Shareholders make in their Brief, pricing gas at cost-of-
service does not assure a price below market. High risk and un-
successful drilling over a period of time, even though exploration 
was aggressively pursued, would place gas customers in a position 
where they paid more tor internally generated production than would 
be paid in the open market. A regulatory commission, in his experi-
ence, would be very hard pressed to permit an unsuccessful utility 
exploration program to continue for any length of time. (Tr. 1230-1) 
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O'Leary studied the settlement Agreement and found that it 
places dry hole risks entirely on the investor, that the utility 
gas customer was served very well, and that if anything, the Agree-
ment does not make a fair distribution from the exploration program 
to MFS shareholders. (Tr. 1226, 1232-3) 
As to the no-profit-to-affiliate rule, O'Leary testified 
that in all of his regulatory experience, he understood it to 
foreclose only abusive profits and not profits which would be 
normally earned in a competitive market. (Tr. 1233-4) On cross-
examination, he stated emphatically that a call on the gas in 
behalf of MFS from wildcat acreage at market price did not vio-
late the no-profit-to-affiliate rule. (Tr. 1238-40) 
Mr. O'Leary stated that in all events, it was extremely 
important that the settlement Agreement and Stipulation, if 
accepted by the Commission, be final and binding in the future 
and as to future parties, so that property transferred, capital 
committed, benefits received, and properties developed in reliance 
upon the Agreement and the Commission Order could not be undone 
or retroactively unraveled to their detriment four to five years 
in the future. 
Howard Ritzma. Ritzma, called by the Division and Committee, 
is a petroleum geologist with vast experience with oil and gas 
activities in the Rocky Mountains. He is the Assistant Director 
and Chief of the Petroleum Section of the Utah Geological and 
Mineral Survey. Ritzma testified that with regard to aggressive 
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exploration companies, they have not wanted to explore jointly with 
MFS because of the utility regulation of the Company. (Tr. 1267-8) 
Further, Ritzma said that in high risk wildcat exploration, it 
would be very difficult for MFS to obtain either exploration 
partners or investors without the prospect of "the big strike" 
which utility regulation cannot provide. (Tr. 1270) 
As to the settlement Agreement, Ritzma had been consulted 
by the Division and Committee in the settlement negotiations as 
a State of Utah employee. Ritzma had written a letter to the 
Commission recommending approval of the settlement Agreement as 
both a State employee and as an expert consultant. The Utah 
Director of Natural Resources had also approved the letter. (Tr. 
1272) 
In the view of Ritzma, the settlement Agreement offers 
better advantages to the utility customer of MFS than the prior 
Joint Exploration Agreement between MFS and Wexpro. (Tr. 1273) 
James A. Harmon. Mr. Harmon, an investment· banker and general 
partner of Wertheim and Co. of New York City who works with large 
instutitional investors trading significant blocks of MFS stock, 
is a member of the MFS Board of Directors. (Tr. 1105-10) Harmon 
has assisted MFS in much of its capital financing and has talked 
with many large shareholders with regard to their view on the 
discontinuance of a utility exploration and development program. 
Mr. Harmon testified that the majority of MFS shareholders would 
not support any further exploration or development program out of 
the utility and that in his judgment, new capital could not be 
raised for such purpose. (Tr. 1137-9) 
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The financial community regards oil and gas exploration as 
one of the highest risk businesses with possible high returns 
whereas the utility business is regarded as one of minimal risk 
with a lower, regulated return. The two concepts are not compati-
ble, because the Commission, while it might allow a higher return 
for the higher risk, could never guarantee it and the equity inves-
tor will never swap the potential of a large return for a fixed 
rate of return. (TR. 1119, 1122, 1130-1) 
If Mountain Fuel were to further explore as a utility in the 
future, the Company could not raise capital for the program. Look-
ing at the settlement Agreement, even though it is complex, Harmon 
concluded that new capital could be raised to finance exploration 
through the unregulated operations of Wexpro and Celsius. (Tr. 
1151) 
R. Don Cash. MFS called Mr. Cash, President of the Company. 
Cash has a significant background in oil and gas exploration in 
several areas of the United States, and especially in the Rocky 
Mountains. Mr. Cash testified that the Wexpro decision and the 
pending litigation between MFS and Wexpro and the public agencies 
had adversely affected the morale of exploration employees of the 
Company. Exploration engineers, geologists, and landmen are in 
~ 
high demand and are extremely valuable. Those employees do not 
like their work subject to retroactive review when the program is 
under utility regulation. (Tr. 1475-6) 
Cash stated that operators in the oil and gas industry shy 
away from arrangements with regulated utility companies because 
it is difficult to keep information confidential. (Tr. 1477-8) 
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Irmnediately after the issuance of the Wexpro Opinion by the 
Utah Supreme Court, MFS suspended its exploration program with 
the exception of those activities that were necessary to pre-
serve properties and meet contractual conunitments. The Company 
had ·no other choice in the matter, because the shareholders had 
no further interest in the previously conducted program. (Tr. 
1479) The exploration program of MFS continued to suffer after 
issuance of the Wexpro Opinion and during the pendency of signi-
ficant litigation. 
Mr. Cash stated that wildcat exploration is high risk busi-
ness, but even development drilling (in already discovered reser-
voirs) is not a "sure" bet, because much of the development 
drilling will be on the rim or edge of the reservoir. (Tr. 1480) 
Mr. Cash stated that under the settlement Agreement, the 
Utility Division of MFS did not surrender any cost-of-service 
gas; those reserves were retained with a supply-life of about 
12 years. (Tr. 1483, 1496, 1507) Although the settlement Agree-
ment concedes more to customers than MFS believed it should, 
the Agreement is in the public interest. Mr. Cash detailed 
the reasons. (Tr. 1486) 
Ralph M. Kirsch. Wexpro called as its witness Mr. Kirsch, Presi-
dent and CEO of Wexpro. A lawyer by training with extensive 
experience in oil and gas exploration·and negotiations, Kirsch 
testified that his direct experience with MFS over many years was 
that it cannot carry on a successful exploration program as a 
regulated utility. (Tr. 1511-14) Mr. Kirsch went on to say that 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
while the additional allowance of 5% and 8% on capital investment 
for development drilling of oil and gas reservoirs was reason-
ably necessary in the Agreement to cover unsuccessful drilling 
costs in said reservoirs, the allowance would not be adequate 
to cover wildcat exploration risks. (Tr. 1118) Of the wildcat 
acreage, 56.2% of the leases will expire in four years, with 
10.6% expiring in 1982, 21.1% in 1983, 8.9% in 1984 and 15.6% 
in 1985. (Tr. 1520) Under the Agreement Wexpro has an obliga-
tion to expend $40 million in development drilling but there 
are no internally generated funds with which to accomplish 
that drilling. (Tr. 1529) 
Mr. Kirsch also explained how the 7% overriding royalty on 
the unexplored acreage works. An override is computed on the 
gross value of production and does not share in any exploration, 
development or production expenses. As a consequence, the value 
of the gross production is usually many times that of the net 
value of production after costs and expenses. Accordingly, Mr. 
Kirsch testified, a 7% override couJ_d be more valuable than a 
50, 60 or even 70% equity interest. (Tr. 1523) 
Mr. Kirsch stated that everything being considered, the 
settlement Agreement providing for an unregulated exploration 
12/ 
program, was fair to all interests.~ He emphasized that the 
settlement must be viewed as a "whole". If an attempt were made 
to change one portion, then some other part of the settlement 
would be impacted. (Tr. 1515) 
During the course of the Kirsch examination, legal counsel for the Division 
and Conunittee as well as MFS and Wexpro expressed to the Conunission that 
the Agreement reflected an attempt to free the exploration program, to 
the extent possible, from utility type regulation. (Tr. 1543, 1573) 
-25""'.' 
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Lyle Hale. Mr. Hale was called as an expert petroleum 
geologist by the Division and Committee. He was familiar with 
MFS exploration properties, having worked in exploration for 
MFS from 1951 through 1974. Hale testified that in his opinion, 
the settlement Agreement was in the public interest and in 
particular, in the interest of the utility gas customer and that 
the consideration to the utility for properties transferred to 
Wexpro and Celsius represented fair market value. (Tr. 1331) 
Merrill R. Norman. Mr. Norman, a CPA who testified in 
opposition to the MFS-Wexpro agreements in 1977, testified that 
the settlement Agreement is in the best interest of the customer. 
(Tr 1279-80) Gas from both oil and gas producing properties will 
go to the utility at cost-of-service prices. (Tr. 1298) In 
Norman's opinion, the Agreement is "far better" than the program 
proposed in the original Wexpro proceedings of 1977. 
Richard B. Rosenberg. The only witness called by the Coal-
ition, Mr. Rosenberg is a recently employed staff attorney of 
the California Public Utilities Commission. While explaining 
the functions of an exploration program in California, he ex-
pressly took no position on the merits of the Stipulation or 
Agreement before the Commission. The Commission expressly so 
found. (See p. 5 of the Report and Order) 
With the exception of Mr. Rosenberg, who took no position, 
all of the witnesses testified that the settlement was in the 
public interest. 
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7. Transfer of Exploration Acreage for Market Value. The 
Coalition maintained that the wildcat exploration acreage to 
be transferred from Mountain Fuel to Celsius under the Agree-
ment should be appraised on a dollar value basis in the tradit-
ional sense an~ monies transferred for the benefit of the MFS 
utility customers. The Coalition failed to produce a shred of 
testimony that the wildcat acreage could be meaningfully apprai-
sed by establishing a fixed dollar amount. The overwhelming 
weig~t of the testimony is that it is neither customary nor 
appropriate to appraise such properties in that manner. 
Indeed, virtually every experienced witness who took the 
stand, testified unequivocally that not only would a dollar 
value appraisal be unavailing and futile, but that the 7% over-
riding royalty with a call on the gas constituted market value 
for the transfer of the exploration acreage. For example, 
Howard Ritzma, testifying for the Division and Committee, with 
vast experience in exploration activities, testified that the 
7% gross overriding royalty and a first call on the gas at market 
constituted fair market consideration for the transfer to Celsius 
of the wildcat acreage (Tr. 1250), and the 2~% royalty on the 
Wexpro after-acquired property is "generous" to the utility 
customer and reflects fair market value. (Tr. 1251-2) The 7% 
overriding royalty on the wildcat acreage was, actually, higher 
than usual. (Tr. 1254) Ritzma, stated, unequivocally, that it 
is not reliable to fix the values in money of unexplored acreage 
and that trying to estimate the volume of oil and gas in wildcat 
acreage is "an exercise in futility." (Tr. 1263) 
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Mr. Hale, a consulting petroleum geologist, testified that 
the 7% overriding royalty and the first call on gas at market 
is a fair consideration for the transfer of the wildcat acreage 
and that trying to place an appraised value, in the traditional 
sense, on the properties would be "very speculative" -- ten 
different geologists would give ten different answers -- a dollar 
value would remain speculative until the property had been dril-
led and produced. (Tr. 1333-5) 
Mr. Roseman for the Division and Committee stated that 
in his experience, transfers of interests in exploration acreage 
in exchange for royalties is generally understood and accepted in 
the industry. (Tr. 1047) Further, he testified that any attempt 
to place a fixed dollar value, per acre, on the wildcat acreage 
would be "very much a guess" and that what the Division and Com-
mittee did was to estimate "what the market would require in the 
way of royalties" for a transfer of the acreage. (Tr. 1045) Rose-
man stated that in his experience, transfer of oil and gas prop-
erties would, in the great bulk of cases, be best valued on a 
royalty percentage, that being "more or less traditional in the 
industry". (Tr. 1046) Mr. Roseman estimated the 7% overriding 
royalty on the wildcat acreage to be worth something like $7 
million dollars per year to the utility gas customer. (Tr. 1055} 
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Ralph M. Kirsch, with years of experience in dealing with 
wildcat acreage, testified that the 7% overriding royalty with 
a call on the gas could be more valuable, in the market, than a 
50%, 60%, or 70% equity interest in wildcat acreage. (Tr. 1523) 
The Commission expressly found in its Report and Order that 
the properties, including the wildcat acreage, were transferred 
"for fair market value as that value is typically deteimined in 
the industry", and that "adequate benefits from the Settlement 
redound to the benefit of customers of MFS". (Finding #10 of 
R. and O. p. 19) 
8. Report and Order, Findings and Conclusions of the Commission. 
Throughout the days of testimony, the Commission evidenced consid-
erable interest in and concern over various aspects of the Stip-
ulation and Agreement. Much questioning occurred both of witness 
and counsel. 
In its Report and Order, the Commission noted that the pend-
ing litigation was extremely difficult and had impaired the bene-
fits of the exploration program to MFS customers as well as the 
public interest, generally. (R. and O. pp. 13, 14) It was 
noted that although the settlement Agreement was to be viewed 
in total and not in separable units, the uncontested testimony 
manifested that the individual properties had been transferred 
for fair market value. (R. and O. p. 16, ~16) 
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The Commission expressly found as fact that the settlement 
Agreement and Stipulation were just and reasonable, in the public 
interest, and that the customers of MFS will be served by approval. 
(Finding #11 p. 19 R. and O.) The Commission concluded it had 
jurisdiction to resolve the controversy and various cases before 
it, that resolution of the contested issues under the Stipulation 
and Agreement was in the public interest, that the Commission had 
jurisdiction to review the transfer of the subject properties 
between MFS and its subsidiaries and that such transfers were for 
market value and in the public interest. (Conclusion #5, R. and O. 
p. 21) 
In paragraph six of the Conclusions, the Commission stated 
that the order was final and necessarily so: 
because to insure the proper development of said 
properties, the parties must be able to rely on the 
finality of the Findings and Conclusions in regard 
to the transfer of properties and apportionment 
of benefits. The Commission also is entitled to 
rely on the finality of its order. (Conclusion 6, 
R. and o. pp. 21, 22) 
As part of the Order MFS was required to reflect in its 
utility rates an annualized reduction of $21 million dollars 
commencing January 30, 1982. (R. and O. •S, p. 23) That portion, 
as well as other facets of the Order were implemented by MFS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
ALONE, IS AUTHORIZED TO ESTABLISH 
THE REGULATORY POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
OF THIS STATE REGARDING THE FUNCTION OF 
A PUBLIC UTILITY AND SUCH POLICY IS CONCLUSIVE, 
UNLESS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The argument of Administrative Services and the Coalition by 
Brief appears to be that this Court is authorized or entitled to 
define the public interest and public policy of Utah with regard 
to the regulation of a public utility. The apparent theory is 
that this Court should review the Findings and Conclusions of the 
Report and Order of the Commission de novo, as to what is and is 
not in the public interest of the public utility regulation of 
MFS and further, that the decision of this Court in Committee of 
Consumer Services (Wexpro Case), supra, somehow constitutes a 
judicial decree mandating that the oil and gas exploration program 
and properties of MFS be regulated and conducted in a specific 
manner. (See Administrative Services Br. p. 14, 15, 29, 46, 62 
and 71) It is, they suggest, as though this Court must assume 
the clearly delineated legislative functions expressly delegated 
to the PSC. They would have this Court abandon its judicial 
duties and assume the legislative (if not social) functions of 
the Commission by undertaking the plenary review and second~guessing 
of every utility policy and public interest determination of the 
Commission. 
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The fundamental flaws in the argument of Administrative 
Services and Coalition are obvious. First, this Court does not 
lay down the regulatory and public policy of Utah with regard to 
public utilities, generally, or MFS, in particular. These are 
tasks delegated by the legislature to the PSC. Second, this 
Court did not carve out a judicial edict in Committee of Consumer 
Services (Wexpro Case) that required a specific implementation 
of a plan for the conduct or transfer of the MFS exploration 
13/ 
program and properties.~ The jurisdiction of this Court to review 
on certiorari an order of the Public Service Commission is defined 
and limited by Statute. Section 54-7-16 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(Repl. vol. 1974) provides: 
The review shall not be extended further 
than to determine whether the commission 
has regularly pursued its authority, includ-
ing a determination of whether the.order or 
decision under review violates any right of 
the petitioner under the Constitution of the 
United States or of the state of Utah. The 
findings and conclusions of the commission 
on questions of fact shall be final and shall 
not be subject .to review. Such questions of 
fact shall include ultimate facts and the 
findings and conclusions of the commission on 
reasonableness and discrimination. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In recognition of that limited scope of review, this Court 
has long held that it should not involve itself in determinations 
of the policy supporting or the wisdom behind a Commission deter-
13/ The scope and meaning of the decision of the Court in Committee of 
Consumer Services (Wexpro Case), supra, has been the subject of extend-
ed and wide-ranging debate in this Case and otherwise. Whether the 
holding of the Case was one squarely on the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission over the classified non-utility oil properties with the balance 
of the opinion being dicta, or whether the many statements of the 
majority Opinion were---a:r:i-central and primary to the reversal of the 
Commission Order, it is clear that the Opinion does not mandate speci-
fic regulatory conduct and continued supervision of MFS oil and gas 
exploration and development. 
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minat1on. In Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 
117 P.2d 298 (1941), this Court noted: 
What policy should be pursued, or what 
conclusions should be drawn from dis-
puted facts·is not a law question for 
the judiciary to decide. 
In Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966) this 
Court reaffirmed the principles annunciated in Mulcahy as follows: 
It is not our prerogative to pass upon the 
wisdom of the Commission's decision. It is 
charged with the responsibility of general 
supervision and regulation of the common car-
riers of this state and of seeing that the 
public receives the most efficient and eco-
nomical service possible. 
See also, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 103 Utah 459, 
135 P. 2d 915 (1943). 
So long as·the decision of the Public Service Commission 
is in conformance with the law, this Court's review is addressed 
to a determination of whether there is reasonably competent 
evidence in the record to support the findings of fact and 
declarations of policy and public interest made by the Commission. 
See, Williams v. Public Service Cornm'n, 29 Utah 2d 9, 504 P.2d 
34 (1972); Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 2 
Utah 2d 23, 268 P.2d 990 (1954). 
The lip service that Administrative Services and the Coalition 
pay to this plainly stated case law is outweighed by their insis-
tent request that this Court set the regulatory policy for the 
Commission regarding oil and gas exploration of MFS and that the 
earlier Wexpro decision be transformed from a judicial opinion 
to a legislative decree. This Court's opinion, invalidating the 
prior J.E.A., did not even purport to design a program for the 
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future exploration and development of the properties, but 
correctly left the designing of a new one for the parties and 
the Commission. That is all that has been done in the instant 
case. 
All parties did agree that the past exploration program 
had resulted in the acquisition of valuable properties and 
that it was in the public interest to explore and develop the 
properties in order to enhance gas supplies for the utility. 
But the Court, in Wexpro, did not (and could not for that 
matter) dictate how the properties were to be developed. 
This Court was correct in refusing to attempt to usurp 
the powers of the Commission by fashioning legislative policy 
and dictating the method of conducting an oil and gas exploration 
program. Why Administrative Services and the Coalition now argue 
from the record in the old case and urge this Court to make a 
decision establishing public policy based on the record in 
that case, is a mystery. 
The facts, issues, and record established before the 
Commission in this matter are not those of the earlier Case, 
and although the language of the 1979 Opinion has been observed 
in the Stipulation and Agreement reached by the parties in this 
Case, the instant record and issues stand on their own feet. 
The established statutory and case law are controlling. 
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POINT II 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ARE FAVORED BY STATUTE 
IN UTAH AND IN THE LAW GENERALLY 
1. The Law Generally. 
Administrative Services is sharply critical of the parties 
for having resolved and settled this long running and complex 
Wexpro dispute. It implies that the compromise of contested liti-
gation is in some way sinister, if not immoral, and that the 
Corrunission somehow lacked the authority or power to approve the 
settlement. The law is to the contrary. Compromise and settle-
ment are encouraged. The policy behind the fostering of settle-
ments of disputed litigation has been well stated by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in International Motor Rebuilding v. United Motor 
Exchange, Inc., 193 Kan. 497, 393 P.2d 992 (1964). At 393 P.2d 
995, the Court put it this way: 
The law favors the amicable settlement of 
disputes. Compromise as a mode of adjusting 
claims should be encouraged by the courts. 
It would be against public policy to prevent 
compromise of claims by compelling all con-
troversies to be adjusted by litigation. 
[citations omitted] 
A compromise does not anticipate that 
the rights of the parties have been settled 
with exact nicety. Courts should not be con-
cerned with the exactness of the accounting 
between the parties in considering the 
validity of a compromise. 
For similar hol~ings, see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Christie, 125 
Ariz. 38, 607 P.2d 21 (1980}; Wheeler v. McNett, 281 Ore. 485, 575 
p. 2d 6 4 9 ( 19 7 8) • 
Moreover, the party challenging the relief has the burden of 
proof, by clear and convincing evidence and only for the strongest 
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reasons, that the settlement should be set aside by the Court. 
Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enterprises, 99 Idaho 539, 585 
P.2d 949 (1978). The foregoing principles apply with equal force 
to the settlement of contested proceedings before administrative 
agencies. Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 373 F.2d 
96 (10th Cir. 1967); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Federal 
Power Corrun'n, 306 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1962). 
2. The Commission is Expressly Authorized by Utah Statute to 
Accept Settlements of the Parties. 
Not only are settlements of disputes pending before ad-
ministrative agencies favored by the courts, settlements of 
disputes before the Utah PSC have been expressly authorized 
and recognized by the Utah Legislature as being in the public in-
terest. In the recently enacted Amendment to Secti.on 54-7-10 (1) 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1981), the legislature declared: 
At any time before or during a hearing or pro-
ceeding before the commission, the parties 
between themselves or with the commission or 
any commissioner, may engage in settlement con-
ferences and negotiations. The commission may 
·at its sole discretion adopt any settlement 
propo·sal of the parties and enter an order 
based upon such proposal if it deems such ac-
tion proper. (Emphasis added.) 
The Commission was unquestionably acting within its statutorily 
delegated authority and in the declared public interest when it 
examined and in its discretion, approved after full hearing, the 
Stipulation and Agreement. 
As will be discussed hereinafter, the Stipulation and 
Agreement in this case satisfy the concerns expressed by this 
Court in its earlier Wexpro Opinion, result in long term benefits 
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to MFS, its customers and its shareholders, saves the Company 
exploration program and is in the public interest. Admini-
strative Services and the Coalition have simply failed to meet 
their burden in challenging this Settlement, and the Order of the 
PSC approving and implementing the same should be sustained on 
this appeal. 
3. The Claim of Appellants is Specious. 
Administrative Services and the Coalition argue that the 
Opinion of this Court in Wexpro constituted a judicial mandate to 
the PSC to collapse all the oil properties into the utility ac-
counts in establishing rates of MFS and to force MFS to explore. 
(Adm. Serv. Br. 73-4, Coalition Br. 10) 
Whatever might be said about the range of the wexpro Opinion, 
no one can reasonably argue that the decision was a decree and 
mandate to implement a judicially fashioned remedy of utility 
regulation. That simply isn't the business of this Court. Under 
all the authority of this Court, utility policy and regulation 
lies solely with the Conunission. The citation by Appellants of 
the Antitrust divestiture decree of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Utah Public Service Conun'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 
14/ 
395 U.S. 464 (1969) ~·reflects the desperation of their posi-
tion. The federal courts are specifically charged by Congress 
with enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, 
15 USC §§1 et seq. Remedial relief is indeed fashioned by 
federal judges in f~deral antitrust litigation. But the 
Utah Supreme Court can hardly be said to be in the same position 
~ Significantly, El Paso did not involve any proceedings before or 
appeal from the Utah Commission. The PSC was only an amicus curiae. 
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in enforcement of utility regulation in Utah. The attempt to use 
El Paso and other similar cases as an analogy here is specious. 
POINT III 
THE VARIOUS CONCEPTS OF LAW 
IDENTIFIED IN THE WEXPRO APPEAL 
WERE RECOGNIZED BY THE PSC ON REHEARING 
AND INCORPORATED IN THE STIPULATION 
AND AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT 
A. The PSC Was Free to Fashion a New Remedy Which Met the 
Legal Requirements Enunciated in the Wexpro Decision. 
Admistrative Services and the Coalition would have this 
Court limit the discretion of the PSC on remand to the mere im-
plementation of a very specific and pre-determined remedy fash-
ioned largely out of their own boot strapping arguments inter-
mingled with occasional dicta from the majority Wexpro Opinion. 
The part of the PSC cannot, under applicable case law, be so 
limited; it is free, within the law, to fashion a new and differ-
ent solution to the problem. 
The watershed case on this issue is F.C.C. v. Pottsville 
Broadcasting, 309 U.S. 134(1940). In that case, a broadcasting 
company sought a permit from the F.C.C. for the construc-
tion of a broadcasting station. The Commission denied the .ap-
plication, finding that the respondent was financially disquali-
fied. The Company appealed, and the Circuit Court reversed and 
remanded, holding that the Commission's conclusion regarding the 
respondent's lack of financial qualification was based on an 
erroneous understanding of Pennsylvania law. 
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Following the remand, the Corrunission set the Company's 
application for argument along with two rival applications which 
had been filed subsequent to the Company's. Pottsville at this 
stage sought and obtained from the Court of Appeals a writ of 
mandamus commanding the Commission to first hear and reconsider the 
Company's prior application "on the basis of the record as ori-
ginally made". 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the determination 
of the Circuit Court that the Commission had failed to follow 
the Court's mandate. In that regard, the Supreme Court said: 
This was not a mandate from court to court 
but from a court to an administrative agency 
• • • . A review by a federal court of the 
action of a lower court is only one phase of 
a single unified process. But to the extent 
that a-federal court is authorized to review 
an administrative act, there is superimposed 
upon the enforcement of the legislative policy 
through administrative control a different 
process from that out of which the admini-
strative action under review ensued. 
*** 
On review, the court may thus correct er-
rors of law and on remand the Corrunission is 
bound to act upon the correction. Federal 
Power Corrun'n v. Pacific Co., 307 U.S. 156. 
But an administrative determination in 
which is embedded a leg~l question open to 
judicial review does not impliedly foreclose 
the administrative agency, after its error 
has been corrected, from enforcing the legi-
slative policy committed to its charge. 
Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 305 U.S. 364 .•.. 
The Commission's responsibility at all 
times is to measure applications by the stan-
dard of 'public convenience, interest, ot 
necessity' ••.• The fact that in its first 
disposition the Commission had committed a 
legal error did not create rights of priority 
in the respondent, as against the later appli-
cants, which it would not have otherwise 
possessed. {Emphasis added.) (309 U.S. at 
141, 145-46) 
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The decision in Pottsville has been repeatedly followed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in support of the proposition that 
an administrative agency may examine a matter after remand on a 
new record and make a decision based on new considerations. 
See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Cornrn'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 
U.S. 194 (1947); F.P.C. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952). 
In the most recent Supreme Court case, N.L.R.B. v. Food Store 
Emoloyees Union, 417 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court stated: 
It is a guiding principle of administra-
tive law, long recognized by this Court, "that 
an administrative determination in which is 
embedded a legal question open to judicial re-
view does not impliedly foreclose the admirii-
strati ve agency, after its error has been cor-
rected, from enforcing the legislative policy 
committed to its charge" ... Application 
of that general principle in this case best 
respects the congressional scheme investing 
the Board and not the courts with broad powers 
to fashion remedies that will effectuate 
national labor policy. (417 U.S. at 9-11) 
See also Ten·nessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comrn'n, 606 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and Empire Electric 
Ass'n v. Public Service Cornrn'n, 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979). 
Thus on the remand from this Court, the PSC had the authority 
and discretion to take a fresh and new approach, within the legal 
bounds of the law, to the questions- surrounding the exploration 
and development program of MFS. That is precisely what the Com-
mission did. 
The Coalition, in three of the four points in its Brief, 
asserts that the PSC erred in not following some imagined all-
encompassing mandate of this Court. The case law cited by the 
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Coalition in support of this position, however, is fully consis-
tent with and relies upon the United States Supreme Court cases 
cited hereinabove. All that is required by those cases is that 
the Commission on remand fashion a remedy which is consistent 
with the law as declared by the Court. As will be demonstrated 
hereinafter, the Commission did just that. 
B. The Order of the PSC Recognizes and Meets the Requirements 
of the Wexpro Decision. 
It is clear that the PSC did not act outside of the dis-
cretion cormnitted to it in approving the remedy fashioned by the 
parties in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement. That 
Stipulation and Agreement, and the order of the PSC approving 
same, clearly meet both the strict legal requirements of the 
Wexpro decision, as well as the more general observations of the 
Court therein. 
1. Jurisdiction of the PSC Over Transfer to Wexpro. The 
fundamental issue in the Wexpro appeal was the determination by 
the PSC that it did not have jurisdiction over the transfer to 
Wexpro of the historically classified non-utility oil proper-
ties of MFS. The settlement Agreement moots the issue of juris-
diction by simply recognizing, for settlement purposes, the 
Commission's jurisdiction over all properties included in the 
transaction. 
2. The Transfers to Wexpro as Approved by the Settlement 
Agreement Are In the Public Interest. The determination of the 
public interest requires a balancing between the interests of 
utility customers in having reasonable rates and reliable ser-
vice with those of utility shareholders in obtaining an adequate 
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return on their investment. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
Public Service Conun'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944). With-
out exception, each industry expert who testified before the 
Conunission in the remand proceedings agreed that the settlement 
Agreement and Stipulation were in the public interest and in the 
interest of the ratepayer, the shareholder, and MFS itself. 
The interest of the utility customers in having reasonable 
rates is protected by the settlement Agreement in insuring that 
natural gas produced in conjunction with existing oil and gas 
reservoirs will come to the utility at cost of service. (Stipula-
tion §§ 3.3.2 and 3.3.6) In addition, the utility is given a 
valuable first call on natural gas located and produced in the 
unexplored wildcat acreage at third-party market prices. (Stipul-
tion §3.3.5) The utility will also receive a 7% overriding 
royalty interest on all oil and gas produced from the wildcat 
acreage (Stipulation §3.3.4), which will assuredly result in net 
gas costs at substantially below market prices. 
The interests of the utility customers in a continued re-
liable source of supply of natural gas, which has been repeatedly 
recognized by the PSC as a critical factor in determining the 
15/ 
public interest, is also recognized in the settlement. The 
Agreement provides the necessary incentives to attract the new 
investment capital required to continue the exploration and devel-
opment program (Tr. 1023, 1029-30) which should supply MFS with 
a secure supply of gas for years to come. The settlement in 
15/ The Utah Public Service Commission expressly recognized the importance of 
securing future supplies of natural gas as a primary factor in assessing 
the public interest in orders issued in PSC Case Nos. 6329, 5907, 4797, 
4392, and 3650. 
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turn recognizes the interest of the shareholders to an adequate 
return on their investment by providing for an unregulated rate 
of return on high risk investment capital. Lastly, the public is 
served generally by providing incentives for the discovery and 
development of domestic oil and gas supplies. 
Thus, it is clear that the settlement Agreement balances the 
interests of the utility shareholders and customers, as well as 
the public. The Agreement is not tilted in favor of the share-
holders of MFS (indeed, against them if anything, under the tes-
timony of Roseman and Harmon) and the Commission did not err in 
finding that the Settlement met the public interest. 
3. The Transfers to Wexpro Were for Fair Market Con-
sideration. Again, without exception, those expert witnesses 
who spoke to the issue in testimony before the PSC stated that 
both the traditional and preferable method of setting market 
value for the transfer of interests in oil and gas properties is 
through the use of royalty or profit interests expressed in terms 
of a percentage of gross or net revenues. The concept is quite 
simple. The more oil and gas that is found, the more valuable is 
the property and the greater will be the consideration secured for 
its sale or transfer. The less oil and gas discovered, the smal-
ler is the value of the property and the smaller will be the 
consideration returned to the seller. The only question that 
remains is what is a fair percentage. 
The testimony was without contradiction that the percentage 
of oil revenues allocated to the utility for the benefit of its 
customers from producing oil properties and the percentage royalty 
on the unexplored acreage were fair and perhaps even above what 
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could have been expected in the litigation. (Tr. 1024-29, 
1254, 1325-31, 1502, 1523) The consideration given thus com-
plies with the requirements of this Court in the prior Wexpro 
decision. 
In contending that the transfers were not for fair market 
value, Administrative Services and Coalition overlook or 
deliberately ignore the other salient factors which were taken 
into consideration by the parties in determining whether the 
properties were transferred for fair market value. The Stipula-
tion provides in pertinent part: 
The Stipulation and Agreement are an inte-
grated whole and each part is dependent on 
all other parts . . . • The totality of the 
consideration flowing to the Company [for the 
benefit of customers] under the Agreement is 
agreed, by the parties, in view of all the 
circumstances, to be the equivalent of fair 
market value for all assets transferred from 
the Company to Wexpro • • . . 
(Stipulation §§3.1 and 3.2) By their failure to recognize 
the integrated nature of the settlement provisions and their 
interdependency upon each other, Administrative Services and 
Coalition present a very misleading and incomplete picture of 
the issue of fair consideration. 
4. Benefits to Ratepayers. This Court expressed concern in 
the Wexpro decision that under the earlier arrangements, the gas 
customers of MFS had not been given enough benefit for the inclu-
sion in rates of some operating expenses incurred in connection 
with the exploration program, and that such benefit should have 
been reflected by some sort of an interest in the acquisition 
and development of the oil properties which MFS had been histori-
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cally required to classify in its non-utility account. The 
settlement Agreement clearly meets and satisfies this concern. 
MFS retains ownership of the gas from existing gas producing 
reservoirs and brings into its system all gas produced currently 
or in the future, from such existing gas reservoirs at cost of 
service, and gets full credit for the value of all existing oil 
production from such reservoirs. Such arrangement assures con-
tinued supplies of low cost gas for the benefit of the customers. 
The Agreement now also allocates to MFS all gas at cost of service 
currently being produced or developed in the future from the ex-
isting oil properties transferred to Wexpro. In addition, 54 per-
cent of the net revenues from the sale of oil produced from said 
oil properties comes to the MFS utility account for the benefit 
of its customers. This is over and above the $21 million one 
time reduction in utility rates of MFS. As to the unexplored 
wildcat acreage, MFS is entitled to a 7 percent overriding roy-
alty interest on all hydrocarbons produced, as well as first 
call on the gas and Wexpro and Celsius assume all the costs and 
risks of such production. In each of .the above described situa-
tions, the consideration flows directly to the ratepayer in the 
form of reduced gas rates. 
Additional benefits to customers as a result of the settle-
ment include: all risk and expense of development drilling in 
producing gas reservoirs is to be borne by Wexpro; a 2-1/2% 
overriding royalty interest on approximately 128,000 acres of 
exploration properties acquired independently by Wexpro; a 
2-1/2% overriding royalty on certain producing acreage 
-45-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
independently acquired by Wexpro; reduction in utility rate 
base by removal of all leaseholds from rate base acdounts, 
thereby reducing utility revenue requirements; elimination of 
all unsuccessful exploration and development expenses from 
ratemaking consideration resulting in reduced utility rates; 
productive gas reservoirs; and, an agreement by Wexpro to pay 
to the Utility for the purpose of reducing rates to customers, 
the amount of $250,000 per year for each of the next 12 years. 
(See Stipulation §3) 
The settlement Agreement unquestionably meets all of the 
criteria discussed by the Wexpro Opinion. 
5. Ratepayers Do Not Contribute to the Exploration ·and 
Development Program. The majority opinion in Wexpro expressed 
concern that the traditional roles of investor and customer 
had, to some extent, been reversed. Rather than simply paying 
for the cost of services rendered, this Court suggested that 
MFS ratepayers had made a ''capital contribution to a speculative 
venture for the purpose of developing oil and gas sources." 
(Wexpro decision at p. 876) While MFS does not concede th~t the 
customer ever made a capital payment to exploration prior to the 
1979 Opinion, it is clear that any concern over the matter has 
been completely removed under the settlement Agreement as 
approved by the PSC. All the costs of exploration and develop-
ment of both developmental wells in known oil and gas reser-
voirs, as well as wildcat drilling on the unexplored acreage 
will be borne by Wexpro/Celsius, and thus by the share-
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holders. The risk capital is provided solely by the investor 
and the shareholder and ratepayer of MFS are each re-established 
in their traditional roles. 
6. The Agreement Does Not Violate the No-Profits-to-
Affiliates Rule. This Court's reference in the Wexpro Opinion 
to the no-profit-to-affiliates rule is general in its treatment 
and makes no attempt to specifically define the scope of the 
rule. An examination of the case law relied upon by the Court, 
as well as other authorities, does add some definition to the 
rule and as so defined, it is clear that the settlement does not 
violate the rule. 
The no-profit-to-affiliates rule originated early in the 
history of utility regulation. It is based upon the principle 
that a utility, by creating an affiliate to perform a service or 
provide a product, cannot use that captive supplier as a ruse to 
make inordinately high profits at the expense of its customers. 
The rule has never stood for the principle, however, that the 
affiliate would be limited to charging its bare costs with no 
return on its invested capital. 
In the recent case of Central Telephone v. State Corporation 
Comm'n, 252 S.E.2d 575 (Va. 1979), the Virginia Commission reduced 
expenses claimed by the utility for certain services and products 
furnished by an affiliate because the payment of those expenses 
would yield to the affiliate a greater return on capital than 
the utility was permitted to earn. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded, holding that the price paid by the 
utility to the affiliate was not unreasonable under the circum-
stances. The Court said: 
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We are unwilling to approve this action 
of the Commission. While it is the duty of 
the Commission to scrutinize prices paid by 
a utility to an affiliated supplier, we find 
no evidence in this case that the expenses in-
curred by Central in the purchase of its supplies 
were exhorbitant, unnecessary, wasteful, extra-
vagant, or incurred in the abuse of discretion 
or in bad faith. [citations omitted] On the 
contrary, there is affirmative evidence that 
the prices paid by Central were as reasonable 
as it could have obtained elsewhere •... 
We observe that there is no evidence of 
of any advantage taken by Central of its affi-
liated relationship with Service Company to 
the detriment of Central and its customers. 
Neither is there any evidence that Service 
Company, in its affiliated relationship with 
Central, enJoys a unique position of market 
power which renders a comparison of prices 
and profits with those of other suppliers 
inadequate as a measure of reasonableness. 
(Emphasis added.) (252 S.E. 2d at 585) 
In the Wexpro decision, this Court quoted a short section 
from Florida Gas Transmission Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 362 
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1966), which merely states the no-profit-to-
affiliates rule in the most general of terms. The Fifth Circuit 
·had no reason to address the rule in any greater detail, since it 
held the rule wa~ not applicable to the facts of that case. The 
so-called subsidiary was not actually under the control of the 
"parent" and as a consequence, the prices set were the result of 
arms length neogitations. The rule should similarly be inappli-
cable here since, as the accountant Walker noted, the terms of 
this settlement, including the price of gas coming from Wexpro, 
were not fixed by MFS and its affiliate, but were the result of· 
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arm's-length negotiations with the Division and the Committee 
(Tr. 1200). 
This Court, in Wexpro, also cited Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944). The 
fact situation there was again quite different from this case. 
Utah Power & Light (UP&L) and the Phoenix Companies, which had 
constructed a plant for UP&L, were subsidiaries of Electric Bond & 
Share. The Commission disallowed in UP&L's rate base any cost 
for the plant in excess of the reasonable costs that Phoenix 
expended in the construction. The Phoenix mark-up, referred to 
as the "Phoenix-fees," were rejected because Phoenix appeared to 
be merely a shell company without assets or employees and render-
ing no service to anyone. It merely acted as a conduit to facili-
tate the marking up of costs by Electric Bond & Share which had 
effectively done all the work. In sustaining the PSC, this 
Court noted: 
The Commission held and the evidence discloses 
that the Phoenix Companies had no assets of 
their own. The Phoenix Utility Company, suc-
cessor to other Phoenix companies, had only 
nominal capitalization and substantially no 
direct overhead costs or administrative 
organization distinct from that of Electric 
Bond &.Share Company ... In view of the 
evidence showing that every service rendered 
by Electric Bond & Share Company was billed as 
an item of cost; that all employees were 
compensated by the Company; that part of the 
overhead expense of the New York off ices was 
allocated to the Utah construction; and the fur-
ther fact that there were no assets or employees of 
Electric Bond & Share that were shown to have been 
devoted to or employed in connection with the 
construction for the Company which were not paid 
for by the Company, we cannot hold that the 
Commission was arbitrary in refusing to include 
in the rate base an additional amount representing 
additional payments to Electric Bond & Share 
Company in connection with this construction. (107 
Utah at 194). 
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This Court went on to point out that the rule there applied 
was limited to the particular facts of the case. The Court 
specifically noted that it was not faced with 
the situation under which the subsidiary cor-
poration has substantial separate assets of its 
own, for as will be subsequently noted, the 
Phoenix companies had no assets. (107 Utah at 
193) 
The facts of the Utah Power & Light case are simply inappo-
site to the case at bar. Wexpro is not merely a shell corpora-
tion. It maintains its own separate offices and employees, inclu-
ding a professional oil and gas exploration staff, and owns sub-
stantial oil and gas properties, including properties and inter-
ests acquired independently of MFS. Wexpro is separately man-
aged and financed. In short, the facts under which this Court 
applied the no-profit-to-affiliates rule in Utah Power & Light 
are totally different from those extant in the instant case. 
Finally, Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 424 
F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969), cited by this Court, does not require 
rejection of the settlement. There the Circuit Court upheld. the 
Federal Power Commission's requirement that the utility pay the 
cost of service, rather than the contract price, for gas obtained 
from the subsidiary. The cost of service applied by the FPC 
however, included a return on capital to the subsidiary; the 
allowance was not confined to merely out-of-pocket costs. 
More importantly, however, the Cities Service case is simply 
out of date. In more recent time, the FPC, its successor the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Congress have, in 
order to encourage exploration and development activities, speci-
fically recognized the right of exploration subsidiaries of juris-
d~ctional pipeline companies to be paid market prices for gas sold 
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to their parent. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 u.s.c. 
§§ 3301 (21) and 343l(b) (1) (E); FPC Opinion No. 770, 10 Fed. 
Power Service 5-293 (FPC 1976); FPC Opinion No. 699-H, 52 F.P.C. 
1604 (1974); Opinion No. 568, 42 F.P.C. 38 (1969). In fact, even 
where the pipeline company itself is conducting exploration, 
FERC allows the pipeline market prices in its rate. Order No. 
2.!!_, Dkt. No. RM 80-6, 21 Fed. Power Service 5-199 (FPC 1980). 
This pricing policy has been determined to be in the national 
public interest. 
The.practical experience in the oil and gas industry as re-
lated by the expert witnesses is also supportive of a limited 
application of the no-profit-to-affiliates rule. Mr. Roseman 
testified that in his experience the rule is applied where the 
affiliate has a captive market in the utility customer because 
the product cannot be acquired by the utility elsewhere. The 
rule is then applied to avoid excessive profits to the affiliate. 
(Tr. 1037-38) 
Mr. Walker testified that the rule was designed to prevent 
excessive profits resulting from a price set other than on an arm's 
length basis. He said this settlement would not violate the rule 
since the prices used in the Agreement were agreed to by the Divi-
sion and Committee in tough, arm's~length negotiations. (Tr. 1200-
01) Mr. O'Leary, testifying for the shareholders, stated that in 
his experience the rule is.designed to insure that prices paid to 
an affiliate are not in excess of a competitive value. The 
settlement in the instant ~ase clearly meets each of the real 
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life criteria set by said expert witnesses. 
Under the Agreement, MFS will be obtaining gas in four dif-
ferent situations involving an affiliate. 
First, gas from established gas reservoirs will continue to 
belong to MFS and will be priced at cost of service. Wexpro 
will operate the fields and will receive its costs, including a 
"utility" indexed return, for any future capital investment asso-
ciated with its services. No possible violation of the no-profit-
to-affiliates rule is involved. 
Second, MFS will purchase from Wexpro at cost of service, 
gas produced from the established oil reservoirs. Again, the 
no-profit-to-affiliates rule is not violated. 
Third, MFS has a 7% overriding royalty interest on all 
hydrocarbon production, plus first right to purchase at market 
prices, all gas produced from unexplored properties which are 
being transferred to Celsius. The market prices will be deter-
mined on the basis of third-party standards and will be the same 
price at which MFS could acquire the· gas from other producers. 
Recovery of the royalty payment will assuredly result in net gas 
prices that are below market prices. (Tr. 1457-8) Even assuming 
arguendo that the purchases violate the no-profit-to-affiliate 
rule, the first right would then be void and the rule would not 
be violated since there would be no sale. 
Finally, MFS has a first right to purchase at market prices 
gas produced by Wexpro from certain of its independently acquired 
properties. If these purchase are determined to violate the 
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no-profit-to-affiliates rule, the first right will be void. No 
sale will take place and the rule will not otherwise be viola-
ted. 
POINT IV 
THE OBJECTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND COALITION 
TO THE SETTLEMENT ARE NOT WELL TAKEN 
A great many of the arguments of 'the Administrative Services 
and Coalition are answered 'both directly and implicitly in other 
sections of this Brief. There are, however, several particular 
statements regarding the settlement made by these Appellantswwhich 
are so out of harmony with the evidence that they merit 
special attention. 
1. MFS Could Not do All Development and Wildcat Drilling 
on These "Joint" Properties at an Assured Cost of Service Price 
Which Would be Less Than Market. Administrative Services makes 
the bald assumption that the utility could do the exploratory 
drilling and development of the wildcat properties with re-
sulting cost-of-service prices for any gas discovered that would 
assuredly be below the prevailing market price. This assumption 
has no evidentiary base whatsoever. 
To the contrary, the evidence shows that MFS would have a 
\, 
difficult, if not impossible, time raising the capital to drill 
as a utility. (Tr. 1026, 1043, 1060, 1230, 1512) In that 
regard, the Company had made the determinatin for legitimate 
business reasons that it could not and would not conduct a regu-
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lated exploration program. Any attempt to force an involuntary 
drilling program by order of the Commission would not likely 
be successful. (Tr. 1073, 1203, 1227) A successful drilling 
program is dependent on highly trained and skilled personnel 
and a forced and regulated drilling program would have little 
chance in a competitive world of keeping these personnel. 
Moreover, many of these properties are in deep-drilling areas 
(Tr. 1457) where it is desirable to share the risk and industry 
people are reluctant to join in a venture with a regulated 
company. (Ritzma Tr. 1267, Roseman Tr. 1034, Cash Tr. 1477, 
Kirsch Tr. 1513) 
Even if, for the sake of sheer argument, it were assumed 
that the utility could somehow be forced to drill, there is no 
guarantee that it would be successful, or that cost of service 
would be below market. O'Leary testified that cost of service 
could exceed market if there were a series of unsuccessful wells 
(Tr. 1231), and Crawford stated that it is impossible to know be-
forehand whether cost-of-service gas prices will be more or 
less than market prices, especially when the benefits to 
customers of the 7% overriding royalty interest are taken into 
account. (Tr. 1457) It was his opinion that the settlement re-
sulted in greater benefits for customers than did the traditional 
"straight line" cost of service approach used in past years. 
(Tr. 1458) Mr. Kirsch testified that the 7% overriding royalty 
interest on all hydrocarbons produced on the exploratory pro-
perties could well be worth more than a 50%, 60%, or 70% 
equity interest in the acreage. (Tr. 1523) Accordingly, the 
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supposition that the utility would assuredly come out better 
if it drilled and developed the wildcat acreage is pure specu-
lation. 
Moreover, any program which would insure cost-of-service 
gas on the wildcat acreage necessarily would involve ratepayer 
participation because, as already noted, it would be extremely 
unlikely that investors would fund such a program. Yet such 
ratepayer participation would again result in the reversal of 
traditional roles between customer and investor earlier con-
demned by this Court. In contrast, under the settlement there 
is no customer participation in the capital costs and dry 
hole expenses associated with either the exploration and 
development of new acreage, or with the drilling of develop-
ment wells in established gas and oil reservoirs. These costs 
fall solely on the shoulders of the shareholders. 
Clearly, the unsupported assertion of Administrative Services 
that the approval of the Agreement may have cost the ratepayers 
$500 million is fictional -sensationalism that serves no useful 
function in resolving this complicated litigation. 
2. The Agreement Pays More Than "Lip Service" to Cost-
0£-Service Gas. Rather than paying mere lip service to the 
concept of cost-of-service gas, as Administrative Services ar-
gues, the Agreement takes great pains to secure gas at the 
lowest rates reasonably possible for the customers of MFS. 
If there is one thing that is abundantly clear from the record 
before the Commission it is that the exploration and development 
program, as it has been operated since the inception of MFS, 
is finished. That program had included so-called joint proper-
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ties, consisting of producing oil and gas reservoirs and wild-
cat acreage held for further development. In the producing 
reservoirs, discovery wells have been completed, but not all 
of the development wells necessary to define the limits of 
the reservoirs and economically produce the f ieldB have been 
fully drilled. The wildcat acreage is, of course, undrilled 
and untested. 
All of the gas currently produced from these so-called 
joint properties, as well as gas produced from development 
wells in known producing reservoirs, goes to the utility at 
cost of service. This is certainly more than "lip service." 
There is a significant difference between the cost-of-service 
gas from wells drilled in the past and today's market price. 
The present wells which are now producing gas were drilled 
at various times over the past decade or so. The drilling 
costs and the. investment in these presently producing gas 
wells is known. The operating expenses are foreseeable. The 
cost of service to produce the gas from these presently pro-
ducing wells.drilled years ago is below the market price. 
The market price of "old" gas of similar vintage or age is 
going steadily upward as the federal government allows pro-
ducers to increase prices in order to stimulate more production 
and to compete with world energy prices. 
As the market price continues to go up with deregulation of 
gas or for other reasons, the spread between cost-of-service gas 
from presently existing wells drilled years ago and market 
prices will increase. There is, thus, a known and specific benefit 
to the customer in getting all of the gas from all of the present-
ly producing wells at cost-of-service prices. 
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The settlement Agreement also takes a giant step toward 
ensuring that the development drilling will provide cost-of-
service gas at less than market prices. If, for example, wexpro 
or Celsius drill 17 consecutive dry holes, (as actually happened 
to another company Tr. 1033), the heavy expense of such failure 
will not be passed on to the customer under the Agreement. If 
they find new gas, an incremental incentive allowance (8% on 
successful, commercial gas wells and 5% on successful oil 
wells) is provided for (Agreement ·ssrr-8, III-5) to help compen-
sate for these costs and the dry hole risks. There is, thus_, a 
lid fixed by the Agreement and, if there should be a run of 
bad luck, those costs cannot be passed on to the ratepayer 
in cost-of-service gas or otherwise. 
On all of the 1.4 million wildcat acres, MFS has a call 
on the gas at market prices, but it is absolutely certain 
that it will not result in the customer paying full market pri-
ces because there is an offsetting 7% overriding royalty on all 
production. Thus, if a wildcat well is drilled on the exploratory 
acreage and it is dry, the loss is totally Celsius. If some 
gas or oil is discovered, Celsius pays the 7% royalty to MFS and 
all of the costs, even if it is a marginal well. There is no 
evidence that the price to the customer would be lower under 
some other program. In fact, there was some concern that the 
deep and expensive drilling MFS may be required to do could re-
sult in cost-of-service exceeding market prices. (Tr. 1231, 
1457) As a result of the costs associated with the deep drilling 
required to explore the wildcat acreage, the 7% royalty might 
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well be more valuable to the utility than cost-of-service gas. 
(Tr. 1457) 
The Settlement Agreement has been carefully drafted to 
secure for the customers of MFS gas at the lowest reasonable 
rates. The concept of cost-of-service gas is the very founda-
tion of that low cost gas. It clearly receives more than lip 
service in the settlement. 
3. Although Title to the Producing Oil Reservoirs Was Left 
With Wexpro, The Statement on p. 47 of the Brief of Administra-
tive Services to the Effect That These Remain Wexpro's Sole and 
Exclusive Property is Wrong. Title to the property must, of 
course, reside somewhere. While who has naked title is of little 
legal significance,-in this case, placing title with the driller 
does have significant operating advantages and does simplify the 
obtaining of permits, the negotiation of farm out and unit agree-
ments, and reduces costs. What is important in the context of the 
settlement, however, is what happens to the benefits from those 
properties. 
The Agreement (§II-5, p.19) expressly provides that the gas 
which is produced in association with the oil from producing oil 
reservoirs will be sold, to the utility at cost-of-service computed 
in the same way the Corrunission presently computes it; under prior 
programs, such gas was sold at field prices. The Agreement also 
contemplates that the oil revenue, after deduction of the opera-
ting expenses and the agreed return on capital, is divided 54% 
to the utility and 46% to Wexpro. (Agreement, §II-4, pp. 17-18) 
The Settlement expressly requires that the utility's share of the 
oil revenues will be used to reduce rates. (Stipulation, §2.1, 
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p.9} As a consequence, MFS retains a very real and beneficial 
interest in the subject properties. 
4. The 5% Incentive Allowance for Successful Development 
Oil Drilling and 8% Incentive Allowance for Successful Develop-
ment Gas Drilling Does Not Provide a 21% and 24% Return. Admin-
istrative Services asserts (p.52 of its Brief) that the allowance 
of 5% incentive return on investment for successful development 
oil drilling and 8% on successful development gas drilling allows 
~ett 
, MFS's affiliate Wexpro a 21% and 24% return on invested capital, 
respectively. The claim is absolutely false. 
It must be noted, as the Certified Public Accountant wit-
ness Walker testified, a development and exploration program 
at some point must recover at least its costs. If it does not, 
the program will eventually go broke. (Tr. 1207-1211} The cost 
~. of acquiring pioperty, paying the annual rent, doing seismic and 
I other work and the cost of unsuccessful drilling are all costs 
which must be Tecovered for a program to remain viable. Under 
the Agreement of Settlement, the cost of future unsuccessful 
development drilling efforts on producing oil and gas reser-
voirs will be borne exclusively by Wexpro. It is undisputed 
that in this development drilling there will be significant edge 
drilling near the rim of the reservoir. !n edge drilling, the 
risk of a dry hole is substantially increased. (Tr. 1480-81) 
Mr. Roseman testified that the incentives for this risk to the 
CC?mpany were "not very substantial". (Tr 10 20) 
Even where oil and gas are located, some of those wells 
will be marginal where the production would not be enough to 
permit the operator to recoup the cost of drilling the well, 
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plus the cost of production. Nevertheless, if the Division 
and the Committee want the marginal gas delivered to MFS even 
though it is more expensive, the costs of the well will be 
capitalized by Wexpro/Celsius. If they do not want the gas 
and it does not measure up to the criteria set forth in the 
Agreement, the excess cost has to be absorbed by Wexpro/Cel-
sius and they get the gas. (Agreement, §§I-19-20, II-8[d], 
III-8[d]) 
The 5% and 8% incentive allowance on invested capital are 
16/ 
to cover these dry hole and marginal well risks. ~.There-
fore, the assertion that this allowance constitutes some sort 
of hidden increase in the ''rate of return" earned by Wexpro 
is a misstatement of the record. 
POINT V 
THE SETTLEMENT .IN NO WAY DIMISHES 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION 
Contrary to the contention of Administrative Services, the 
Commission does not, under the Settlement, surrender any of its 
statutory powers or jurisdiction. The Commission has not been 
asked to prejudge whether Celsius or Wexpro will be regulated as 
utilities because of the way they operate in the future. 
It is the position of the parties under the settlement that 
an oil business in Utah is not regulated as a utility. It is in-
16/ The parties to the settlement acknowledged that the higher risks of 
development well drilling must be recognized. In Section 2.2 of the 
Stipulation it was agreed that "Wexpro should have sufficient legal and 
economic incentive that it, in its own self interest, will prudently and 
energetically exploit the properties to their full potential for the 
benefit of the Company's customers and its shareholders." Administrative 
Services also loses sight of the fact that th~ $40 million commitment 
of Wexpro is very much at risk. (Tr. 1256) 
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tended to have Wexpro become the operator of the producing 
properties and to have Celsius operate as an oil company. (Tr. 
1528) None of this has in any way foreclosed the exercise of any 
jurisdictional power by the PSC. One of the principal issues be-
fore this Court in Wexpro was the jurisdiction of the Commission 
over the transfer of oil properties. That jurisdiction was ex-
pressly recognized in the settlement. The transfers to Wexpro 
and Celsius were submitted to the jurisdiction of the Commission 
for approval. 
It is true that if the settlement is affirmed the Commis-
sion will lose jurisdiction over the transferred property. Such 
loss of jurisdiction after the transfer was intended by the 
parties in order to permit the development of a vigrorous and un-
regulated oil and gas exploration program. (Stipulation §§ 1.21, 
1.23, 2.2, 2.4) There should be nothing startling about such a 
loss of jurisdiction. Utility companies frequently, for a variety 
of .reasons, dispose of property which had been used and useful 
in the utility business. The PSC can and does exercise its 
jurisdiction to approve the sale of the property. After the sale 
is closed, however, the Commission cannot, at some future date, 
assert jurisdiction over the property and undo that which has 
already been done. Such a limitation clearly recognizes and 
in no way diminishes the PSC jurisdiction. 
Finally, the stipulation of the Division and Cornrnittee, 
that they will not assert that the activities of Wexpro or Celsius 
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under the Agreement result in their being subject to public 
utility regulation (Stipulation §§11.1, 11.2) takes nothing 
away from the Commission's jurisdiction and power. If the 
Commission has jurisdiction, the stipulation cannot change 
that fact. The Commission itself recognized that the settle-
ment did not diminish its jurisdiction. In the Conclusions 
of Law of its December 31, 1981 Order, the PSC stated "By 
adopting and approving this Stipulation, the Commission does 
not relinquish or limit any jurisdiction or statutory author-
ity it possesses". (Order, p. 22) 
This concern of Administrative Services is invalid for 
two reasons. First, it was erroneously contended in the pro-
ceedings before the Commission in this case that the stipulation 
between the Divis.ion and Mountain Fuel could bind the Commission, 
since the Division acted as the staff of the Commission. Under 
the present case law, however, it is clear that the Division does 
not serve in a staff role to the Commission. Utah Department of 
Business Regulation, Division of Public Utilities v. Public 
Service Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 Utah (1980). Second, even if the 
Division is the staff of the Commission or becomes the staff of 
the Commission under some future statutory scheme or court 
opinion, it is accepted that an agreement or stipulation of the 
staff of an administrative agency is not binding on the agency. 
Kixmiller v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974); Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 
151 P.2d 467 (1944). 
The concerns that the settlement adversely impacts the 
jurisdiction of the Commission are plainly unfounded. 
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POINT VI 
THE COMMISSION ORDER IS FINAL 
AND BINDING ON THE PARTIES AND ON THE COMMISSION 
UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA 
The Shareholders have asserted that the Commission did not 
go far enough in its December 31, 1981 Findings, Conclusions and 
Order in confirming the finality of the distribution of the 
property and the allocation of the benefits. The facts and 
applicable law necessarily lead to an opposite conclusion. 
The Commission found that it had jurisdiction to review 
the transfer of property between MFS and its affiliates, as 
contemplated by the Agreement, and to determine whether the 
transfer was in the public interest and for fair market value. 
The Commission then entered its Conclusion No. 6, as follows: 
The Commission's findings and conclusions with 
regard to the transfer of properties and the 
allocation of benefits contemplated by the 
Settlement, including the findings and conclu-
sions ~hat the transfer of properties and the 
allocation of benefits are reasonable and 
for market value and are in the public interest, 
are intended by the Commission to be final and 
not subject to future change (except through an 
appropriate and timely petition for rehearing or 
judicial review) . The Commission so concludes 
because to ensur~ the proper development of said 
properties, the parties must be able to rely on 
the finality of the findings and conclusions in 
regard to the transfer of properties and appor-
tionment of benefits. The Commission also is 
entitled to rely on the finality of its Order. 
{Emphasis added.) 
The Commission was correct in its conclusion that the Order 
was final and that such finality is necessary to ensure the proper 
development of the properties. 
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Historically, there was a reluctance on the part of the 
courts to afford res judicata effect to the decision of admini-
strative agencies. For example, see Pearson v. Williams, 202 
U.S. 281 (1906) and Warburton v. Warkentin, 345 P •. 2d 992 (Kan. 
1959). However, a dramatic change in the attitude of the courts 
occurred in 1966 with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 
(1966). The Court there held: 
Occasionally courts have used language to the 
effect that res judicata principles do not apply 
to administrative proceedings, [citations omitted] 
but such language is certainly too broad. When an 
administrative agency is acting in a judicial 
capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact 
properly before it which the parties have had an 
adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have 
not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce 
. repose. (384 U.S. at 421-2) 
As a result of this decision, both federal and state courts 
have widely extended the doctrine of res judicata to decisions of 
administrative agencies in appropriate cases. In Philadelphia 
Electric Co. v. Borough of Lansdale, 424 A.2d 514, 521 (Pa. 1981) 
the Court expressed the application of the doctrine of res 
judicata to administrative proceedings as follows: 
Plaintiff further argues, however, than [sic] 
an administrative decision has no res judicata 
effect upon a subsequent action to determine an 
issue within the jurisdiction of the administrative 
agency •... However, the application of res 
judicata principles is not precluded merely 
because administrative proceedings are involved 
and where an administrative agency is acting in 
a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues 
of fact properly before it which the parties have 
had an adequate opportunity to litigate the courts 
will not hesitate to apply res judicata prin-
ciples. 
For similar holdings, see Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. 
~dgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1969): 
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Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel. Co., 604 P.2d 4 (Alaska 1979); 
Campbell v. Superior Court, 18 Ariz. App. 287, 501 P.2d 463 
(1972); Cooper v. United States, 546 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1976). 
The sister doctrine of collateral estoppal is also equally 
applicable to administrative proceedings. In Superior's Brand 
Meats, Inc. v. Lindley, 403 N.E.2d 996, 999 (Ohio 1980) the 
Court made the following pertinent cormnents: 
The doctrine of collateral estoppal is an 
important. element of ·our legal system. It provides 
a necessary degree of finality to decisions ren-
dered by our courts. Finality is a desirable ob-
jective in administrative proceedings, as well. 
We recognize the need for flexibility in ap-
plying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to ad-
ministrative decision-making process; however, be-
cause of the need for finality, we hold that 
ordinarily, where an administrative proceeding is 
of· a judicial nature and where the parties have had 
an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues in-
volved in the proceeding, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppal may be used to bar litigation of the is-
sues in a second administrative proceeding. 
In Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), the 
court was faced with whether the State of Indiana, whose state 
court decisions had been silent on the subject, would extend the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to proceedings 
before administrative agencies. After outlining the history of 
the development of the application of those doctrines in state 
administrative proceedings, the court went on to review cases 
from some 14 separate state court jurisdictions in which the doc-
trines of res judicata and collateral estoppel had been applied 
to administrative proceedings. 
Utah unquestionably follows this modern trend. This Court 
was applying principles of res judicata to administrative 
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hearings long before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Utah 
Construction, supra. For example, in Mulcahy v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941), this Court expressly 
said that the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once 
judicially determined by competent authority "applies as well to 
judicial and quasi-judicial acts" of administrative boards. In 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 118 Utah 602, 
223 P.2d 577(1950) this Court held that an Order of the PSC 
which had not been appealed from had the same effect as a judgment 
and could not be collaterally attacked. 
Finally, in Bowen Trucking, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n 
559 P.2d· 954, 957 (Utah 1977), the Court made the following pert-
inent observations: 
[I]f the fact situation and the legal issues are 
exactly the same, I see no reason why a decision of 
the Commission should ~ot be res adjudicata as to 
such facts and issues, the same as in any other 
legal proceeding; and there are good and sufficient 
reasons why the parties should not be permitted an-
other, and what could be indefinitely repeated 
other trips on a merry-go-round of the same litiga-
tion. 
The common thread running through all of these cases is that 
in order for a prior decision to be given res judicata effect, 
the administrative agency must be acting within its jurisdiction 
and the prior proceeding must have afforded the parties a full 
opportunity to be heard, including an opportunity to seek court 
review from any adverse holding. All of the required factors 
are clearly present here. 
The Commission's Order recites the notice that was given 
and the opportunity offered for all to be heard. The proceedings 
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were conducted in a judicial format, with the witnesses being sworn 
and then being examined and cross-examined on the record. All 
interested parties were afforded an opportunity to argue the matter 
orally and to submit written memoranda. The Commission then 
entered formal findings of fact and conclusions of law and a 
decision. As is evidenced by this Appeal, there is a right of 
court review. 
There is also a critical need for finality. The record 
clearly demonstrates that millions of dollars will be required 
to do the exploratory and development drilling; that the funds 
cannot be generated internally and that those asked to provide 
the money through equity or debt financing will require security 
of expectations. (Tr. 1523) The Settlement requires that Wexpro 
expend not less than $40 million over the next five year period 
for development gas well drilling alone. This amount of capital 
cannot be raised unless investors have assurance that the program 
they invest in and the benefits they can realize, will not be 
changed by some future PSC decision. 
Common sense, as well as the uncontroverted testimony 
dictates that people cannot be induced to invest in wildcat oil 
drilling if after the "big strike" the Commission can renotice 
these very same issues for hearing, set aside or modify the 
Stipulation and Agreement and Order and reverse the transfer of 
property and/or change the allocation of the benefits. 
The fact that the Commission has continuing jurisdiction 
to regulate the distribution system and to regulate MFS as a 
utility, does not change the res judicata finality of this Order. 
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Factual determinations are and must be final. The transfers to 
Wexpro are and must be final. Such finality of past determination; 
while the agency maintains a continuing jurisdiction is not unique 
or even unusual. 
Administrative agencies consistently maintain a contin-
uing jurisdiction even though res judicata effect is given to 
prior administrative decisions. For example, the Industrial Com-
mission has jurisdiction over industrial injuries and retains con-
tinuing jurisdiction over future medical expenses, the extent of 
disability and similar matters. When an employee claims compensa-
tion and there is a hearing and the right of appeal, the decision 
reached therein is final and even though the Commission exercises 
jurisdiction later on over some other phase of the problem. The 
Commission never readjudicates, however, the earlier determination 
that an injury was or was not compensable. See §35-1-78 Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1981) and Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 
61 Utah 514, 215 P. 1047 (1923); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952 (1967). 
Likewise, the State Engineer enters orders and by sections 
73-3-14 and 15, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1980) there is a 
right of court review. While he keeps jurisdiction for a variety 
of reasons, he is not permitted to relitigate an issue which he 
has already fully heard, decided and on which the appeal time has 
run. See Provo City v. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185 (Utah 1976); and 
Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Meyers, 24 Utah 2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970). 
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The order of the Utah PSC in the instant case clearly falls 
within the scope of the foregoing rule. The transfer of the 
properties and the allocation of benefits from the consideration 
given for such transfers are final and entitled to the applica-
tions of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppe~. 
POINT VII 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO ORDER 
AN ACREAGE OR MONETARY APPRAISAL 
OF THE PROPERTY 
The Coalition asserts at page 19 of its Brief that if any 
of the utility property was to be transferred it was necessary 
to express that consideration in dollars. In Wexpro, this 
Court noted that book value was not necessarily market value and 
that a transfer of utility assets had to be made at market 
value so that an "appropriate" benefit will redound to the credit 
of customers. Quite correctly, the Court itself made no attempt 
in the Wexpro Opinion to define or set that market value or 
determine how it was to be done. 
The settlement Agreement does not contemplate a transfer 
for a dollar consideration. Instead, the unexplored wildcat acreage 
is transferred in return for an overriding royalty interest. As 
already set out in detail at pages 27-29 of the Statement of Facts, 
each of the witnesses who testified on the subject stated that 
an overriding royalty on the unexplored wildcat acreage was the 
standard method of fixing the value of the unexplored oil and 
gas properties and that the 7% override was fair consideration 
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for transfer of the specific properties subject to the settle-
ment. (Roseman Tr. 1026-29; Ritzma Tr. 1250-54; Cash Tr. 
1502; Kirsch Tr. 1520; Hale Tr. 1331) Ritzma further indicated 
that the 2-1/2% override on the future acquired property was 
"generous". (Tr. 1252) 
When asked if a dollar value appraisal was a viable alter-
native for fixing the value of the unexplored acreage, the 
witnesses uniformly rejected such a fixed value appraisal as 
"speculative" and "futile". (Roseman Tr. 1045-46; Ritzma Tr. 1263, 
1274; Hale Tr. 1333-35·, Harmon Tr. 1155) 
Clearly, the correct valuation method and that agreed upon 
by the adversary parties in this case is to follow the plainly 
understood market and standard industry practice. The 7% over-
riding royalty interest assures "appropriate" benefits no matter 
what value the property turns out to have. Customers receive the 
benefit of any production of hydrocarbons, no matter how great 
or how little. There is no need to guess and speculate as to 
the possible future value of production from undrilled acreage. 
The Coalition ignores this consideration and returns to the 
arguments already resolved by the earlier appeal. It asserts, 
for example that the property has a fair market value and that 
the value is likely to be far in excess of depreciated book 
value. So what? There is no longer any proposal before this 
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Court to transfer the property only at depreciated book 
17/ 
value. The value of the property is now expressed in terms 
of an overriding royalty, and percentage interest, which the 
uncontroverted testimony explained was the traditional method 
of expressing market value in the oil and gas industry. 
In short, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is to 
the effect that properties are traditionally traded by buyers 
and sellers in arm's-length transactions on the basis of percen-
tage interests in the property; that on unexplored acreage, it. is 
neither useful nor the practice to make estimates on the value 
of the property or the reserves and, even if they are put on 
the market, knowledgable oil companies ascribe widely differing 
values to the property; that a dollar value could be established 
by trying to sell the property on the open market for a speci-
fie dollar amount, but it would not be in the interest of the 
public, the Company or the consumer for those properties to be 
sold since all would lose the continuing benefits from the 
development of the properties which are secured under the 
Stipulation and Agreement. 
There is no error in this regard and the Commission Order 
should be affirmed. 
17/ The mechanics of transfer of the wildcat acreage involves the conveyance 
of title or working interests in the property as well as normal accounting 
entries. The value of the properties as recorded on the books of the 
Company (acquisition cost or investment) is removed from rate base in 
the utility accounts. The properties are then recorded on the books of 
Celsius at that value. The investment of MFS in Celsius then equals the 
value of the acreage. The removal of the properties from the rate base 
accounts of the utility benefits customers in that investment upon which 
a rate of return is calculated is reduced, thereby reducing the revenue 
requirements of the utility and the rates to the customer. 
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C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The Report and Order of the Commission in this matter re-
quires affirmance. It brought to an end, sharply contested 
and expensive litigation spanning five years of time involving 
the exploration and development properties of MFS. The impact 
and uncertainty of that litigation had effectively paralyzed 
MFS exploration and a further continuance of the proceedings 
could have been, in the words of Roseman for the Division and 
the Committee, a "disaster" regardless of who prevailed. 
The record is replete with elements of risk and jeopardy 
which further proceedings would have presented to the utility 
gas customers, to corporate shareholders and to the essential 
integrity of the MFS exploration and development program. While 
all aspects of the record below are important, the "Stipulated 
Facts", "Objectives", "Consideration" and the "Agreement" at 
pages 3-17 of the Stipulation are required reading to a com-
prehension of the issues and they are commended in particular, 
to the Court. 
Those who would claim that the Stipulation and Agreement 
of settlement were a "soft", "sweetheart" arrangement, abuse 
the English language. The settlement and Stipulation were struck 
after difficult, sometimes bitter, arms-length bargaining with 
impasse reached on several occasions. Settlement remained in 
doubt even through the drafting of the Stipulation and Agree-
ment, after an understanding in principal had been already 
hammered out. 
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However, the significance of the Stipulation and Agreement, 
does not rest only upon achieving the settlement of complex liti-
gation. The Agreement reached provides far-reaching benefits to 
the utility customers (in the form of low cost-of-service gas 
and strengthened future gas reserves} and is in the public inter-
est in the broadest context of that term. 
The Commission had authority to adopt and did not err in 
approving the Stipulation and Agreement of settlement. The 
findings are sustained by practically all of the competent 
and admissible evidence, from the testimony of economists, 
geologists, security analysts, petroleum engineers and accoun-
tants from both sides of the controversy. 
The argument of Administrative Services and Coalition that 
the 1979 Wexpro opinion of this Court constituted a judicial 
mandate compelling the Commission to implement specific regula-
tory policy as to MFS exploration and development is fatally 
flawed. It misconceives or ignores the fundamental, appellate 
function of this Court. Regulatory policy is the function of 
the Commission, alone. The role of this Court on review is to 
determine if an error in law exists or if the order is sustained 
by competent evidence. Whether all of the language in the Wex-
pro decision was central or dicta to the principal holding, not-
withstanding, it cannot be gainsaid that the Stipulation and 
Agreement satisfy the holding and observations made by the 
majority Opinion in Wexpro in all regards. 
The uncontradicted competent evidence is that the transfer 
of exploration and development properties (all of which were 
assumed to be in the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction} under 
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the Stipulation and settlement were, at the very least, for fair 
consideration and value. In fact, there is no competent evid-
ence in the record to the contrary. 
The appeal of the Shareholders is not well taken. While 
it is ackn.owledged that the Report and Order of the Commission 
must have the finality of res judicata with regard to the trans-
ferred properties, the Report and Order, at page 21 paragraph 6 
in particular, accomplishes finality with the effect of res 
judicata. The Commission, MFS, Wexpro, Celsius, and gas customers 
are assured under the Report and Order as well as the controlling 
case law, that the properties subject to the Stipulation and Agree-
ment may not be attacked or questioned in the future. 
The Report and Order concluding this massive controversy and 
approving the Stipulation and Agreement of settlement should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Stephen H. Blum, Esq. 
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Bruce Plenk, Esq. 
Ronald E. Nehring, Esq. 
352 South Denver Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas A. Quinn, Esq. 
Robert A. Thorpe, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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